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Bianca Cepollaro
Let’s observe a simplification of Descartes’ conception of reasoning: it’s the capa-bility of distinguishing true from false1. According to Descartes, this capability ofdiscerning true from false is what explains human superiority.Nevertheless, we’ve got an enigma about reasoning: if reasoning is the power ofdistinguishing truth from error and this power is what distinguishes us as humans,why don’t we agree on what is true?Let’s consider perception for a moment: the fact that human beings are providedwith perception generates a sort of convergence. Of course there are some difficul-ties, but there is at least a general convergence. We don’t observe the same thingfor reasoning. There are of course cases where there’s strong convergence: imaginethat people have to describe a picture with 3 zebras and a giraffe and then evaluatethe sentence “there are more zebras than giraffes”, by choosing one of the followingevaluations: certainly false/probably false/probably true/certainly true. We expectto find a very strong convergence on “certainly true”; but consider now the follow-ing case: there are 22 farmers in the village; none of them has more than 17 cows.People have to evaluate the sentence “At least two farmers have the same number ofcows”, choosing among: certainly false/probably false/probably true/certainly true.The correct answer is “certainly true”: yet, only the 30% of people gives the rightanswer.Descartes answered to similar concerns saying that the divergence in our opin-ions depends on the fact that we don’t consider the same things and our thoughtsfollow different leads. Nevertheless, many experiments show that people just reasonpoorly.
1“La puissance de bien juger et distinguer le vrai d’avec le faux, qui est proprement ce qu’on nommele bon sens ou la raison, est naturellement égale en tous les hommes”, Descartes (1637: part I).
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Let’s now consider the relationship between perception and reasoning. Accord-ing to the Standard view, besides perception, we’ve got reasoning: experimentaldata show that human reasoning is indeed quite poor. In order to explain that, thestandard view distinguishes two mechanisms within reasoning (theory of a doublesystem of inferences):
1. Intuitive inferences (System 1): rapid heuristics that work well in most ordi-nary cases but produce mistakes in non-ordinary situations.
2. Reasoning (System 2): it can check and correct the output of intuitive infer-ences.
Going back to the farmer case, the intuitive answer would be that it is probablytrue. We can make a more systematic reasoning and say: there are 17 possiblecategories of farmers: those with 1 cow, those with 2 cows, etc. Since there are22 elements, and there is no category that has more than 17 cows, there must beat least one category with more than an element: so we correct our intuition andchoose “certainly true” rather than just “probably true”.This standard view we just presented proposes indeed a plausible hypothesis.Nevertheless, things don’t work this way: people don’t use conscious reasoning tocheck and correct intuitive inferences, but rather to justify them. Besides, peoplemake not only intuition errors, but also reasoning errors. Reasoning is not generallymore reliable than intuition. If we look at the literature on human reasoning (Evans1989), a good example is the so-called “confirmation bias” (see also Nickerson 1998),a well-known and widely accepted notion of inferential error.Let’s consider now another hypothesis, that puts into question the idea that thereis a general system of reasoning. Maybe there are a lot of specialised mechanisms,i.e. modules: intuitive inferences are carried out not by a general mechanism ofintuition but by many modules, just as perception.Let’s consider now the hypothesis according to which homologous inputs activat-ing different modules may get different interpretations. This hypothesis is compati-ble with the following result. Consider the farmer case again, in a slightly differentversion: there are 22 pupil in the class; each got a score between 1 and 17 in thetest; people have to evaluate the sentence “There are at least 2 pupils who got thesame score” choosing among these options: certainly false/probably false/probablytrue/certainly true. Even if the problem is the very same as the cows one, peopleare better at this one (and it’s a pretty robust result). Logically, it’s the very samething. This is compatible with the idea that homologous inputs activating differentmodules may get different interpretations.Let’s now consider the relationship between reason and reasoning: these twothings are usually analysed separately (for example, people working on practicalreason don’t take reasoning into consideration and vice versa). Consider the fol-lowing case. Night of November 3rd 2013 at Dearborn Heights: Theodore Wafer is
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awaken during the night by someone; he takes his gun and he kills the person athis door, namely Renisha McBride.Let’s consider how people have been talking about Theodore Wafer’s reasons.The defence said that he was scared and he was defending himself; the prosecutionsaid that the fear was unreasonable: he would not have opened the door if he wasscared, he would have just called the police. We observe that the reasons that arediscussed often have two functions: explication (why Theodor did what he did) orjustification (were his reasons “good” reasons to act?). The motivating reasons haveto be seen as justifying by the agent. On the other hand, justifying reasons have tobe such that they could motivate the agent.Notice that this discussion also interacts with the notion of moral luck : if theperson shot turned indeed out to be a dangerous, armed criminal, T.W. reasons wouldprobably have been judged as good enough.Let’s now take stock and consider a first approximation of the notion of “reason” :reasons are the combinations of actual or potential beliefs and desires that to someextent justify accepting some further belief of making some decision (and carryingit out). Beliefs and desires are about some state of affairs. Reason are for somemental representation. Reasons are defined in relation to what they are reasonsfor; in other words, reasons can be stronger of weaker, better or worse.A related question is: do we know our reasons? We said we have two kinds ofreasons: to explain or to justify; the explication-reason is more fundamental: firstyou explain, then maybe you justify.Was T.W. conscious of his reasons when he acted? Are we generally conscious?Do we have unconscious reasons that we can then introspect? About this question,see: Nisbett R. E. and Wilson, T. D. (1977).Another related study is Hall L., Johansson P., Strandberg T. (2012) about choiceblindness and attitude reversals on a self-transforming survey: subjects had to an-swer some questions, then they do something else, and after five minutes they haveto justify their previous answer. Some people are indeed presented with the answerthey provided, some others are presented with an opposite answer, presented as if itwas their original one. The interesting result is that the majority of people presentedwith an opposite answer construe coherent arguments supporting the opposite oftheir original position, i.e. they don’t notice that the one they are presented with isnot the answer they gave, rather the opposite. If we had reasons before we give ananswer this should not happen: this happens precisely because we form reasonsafter we choose our answer.So, what functions reasons serve? Primarily, a double social function: evaluation(justification or criticism) and commitment : to indicate a certain norm, to motivate.We take a responsibility and commit ourselves to behave in a certain way in thefuture. We can also wonder if reasons ever guide us. They may help guidingour actions when we factor in their reputational benefits and costs. I can give up
RIVISTAITALIANADIFILOSOFIAANALITICAJUNIOR6:1(2015)
62
Bianca Cepollaro Le raisonnement comme moyen de convaincre
something in order to get something I can justify. Consider the following study:people have to choose one piece of chocolate that comes in two possible shapes: alittle heart and a cockroach. People tend to choose the heart, even if the cockroachone is a bigger piece of chocolate. One might conclude that to the extent that peopleare guided by reasons (for reputational concerns), reasons may help predict theirbeliefs and actions.Our intuitions about reasons concern the reasons-beliefs pair and the reasons-decisions pair. These intuitions have both normative and descriptive aspects. Thenormative aspect of our intuition about reasons is essential to evaluate, justify orcriticize beliefs and actions of the people who hold those beliefs etc. In general ourintuitions are justified (for example, when the sound of steps is growing louder, weintuitively infer someone is getting nearer. This fact is a good reason to believethat someone is getting nearer). So we can say that reasons fulfil their functionin communication in explaining, justifying, criticizing beliefs or behaviours of otherpeople or of oneself.Let’s now consider reasons in reasoning: if reasons can justify part of our presentbeliefs and decisions, they can also be used to convince others to adopt the beliefsthey justify (if the circumstances are relevantly similar) or to make the same decision.In other words, the main function of reasoning is to produce reasons to convinceothers and to evaluate the reasons others produce to convince us. In this sense,we can consider trust as a reason to believe: trusting a source is generally a goodreason to believe what it communicates. Being trusted is generally sufficient topersuade one’s audience. Indeed much of human communication is made possibleby trust. Obviously, trust is common but not universal nor automatic: humansexercise epistemic vigilance. Now, when trust is not enough, the communicator mayfail to communicate what she intended; a sufficient authority is required. Whatbecomes interesting is the use of reasons to overcome the trust bottleneck : we mayaccept information from a source that we do not trust sufficiently if she providesreasons for this acceptance. Providing reasons is, for the communicator, a means toconvince a reluctant audience. Evaluating reasons is for the audience a means toacquire information from an insufficiently trusted source. In reasoning understoodthis way, the production of reasons should be aimed to persuasion. It should focuson reasons in favour of the conclusion the reasons-producer wants her audience toaccept. We also expect that reasoning to persuade should have a confirmation bias.We can imagine a sort of division of cognitive labour: each group member lookedfor arguments supporting her perspective and attacking the point of view of othergroup members. In the end, each opinion is thoroughly evaluated. When peoplewho disagree but share an interest in getting at a good solution argue, reasoningshould produce good results. Wason selection task (see Moshman and Geil (1998))shows very interesting results that concern how we perform alone and in groups:18% correct individual solution; 80% group correct answers. This can be interesting
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in fields such as justice, educations, research, etc. Note that we are not concernedwith the well-being of the group itself, rather with the good of the individuals.Let’s now assess the question about when collective reasoning does not work :reasoning is one of many cognitive mechanisms, it’s not the only one. Individualreasoning often fails because the confirmation bias is not held in check and in-deed people can reinforce their false belief: group polarization may lead to groupfanaticism.To sum up, here are the two conclusions that can be drawn from this discussion:
1. The main function of reasoning is social.
2. The cognitive and social aspects of reasoning can only be understood together.
